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1. Introduction 
According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables 
(Montero 2010): intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described 
by fundamental physics (Alter and Nagasawa 2012, Chalmers 2013, Alter and Pereboom 2019). 
Lately, Russellian monism has attracted considerable interest. This is partly because it is thought 
to have distinctive theoretical benefits with respect to both the hard problem of consciousness 
and thorny issues concerning mental causation (Chalmers 2013).1 The recent interest is also 
partly due to the fact that the theory comes in a physicalist variety (Stoljar 2001, Pereboom 2011, 
Coleman 2015, 2016, Montero 2015). On Russellian physicalism (Chalmers 2013, Montero 2015), 
inscrutables are physical properties. The hope is that Russellian physicalism might eventually 
provide a more satisfying physicalist picture of the place of consciousness in nature than 
traditional physicalist views do. 
 However, Kevin Morris (2016) and Christopher Devlin Brown (2017) see a problem 
lurking. For Russellian monists, inscrutables are among the world’s fundamental properties (at 
least, they are no less fundamental than any other properties).2 For physicalists, no fundamental 
property can be ‘experience specific’, where a property P is experience specific if P’s relationship 
to experience individuates P, that is, if that relationship makes P the property it is (Morris 2016; 
 
1 But see, for example, Howell 2015, Kind 2015, Ney 2015. 
2 Henceforth we will assume that some properties are fundamental. But see Schaffer 2003. 
cf. Wilson 2006). Following Barbara Gail Montero (2015), Morris and Brown contend that any 
theory that posits experience-specific fundamental properties is not what she calls a ‘full-blooded 
form of physicalism’ (Morris 2016, p. 183; Montero 2015, p. 210) — or as we will put it, no such 
theory is genuinely physicalist.  And, according to Morris and Brown, inscrutables threaten to be 
experience specific. There thus seems to be a problem for theorists who wish to combine 
Russellian monism with physicalism. Russellian monists posit inscrutables. But if inscrutables are 
experience specific, then positing them is incompatible with genuine physicalism.3 
 We will argue that the problem Morris and Brown see is illusory. The alleged problem 
traces to an assumption that Russellian physicalists can and should reject: the assumption that 
inscrutables must be individuated by their grounding roles, that is, by their roles in constituting 
phenomenal properties or categorically grounding dispositional properties.4 If our argument is 
sound, then the promise of Russellian physicalism remains undiminished. 
 
2. The Morris–Brown Argument 
Why do Morris and Brown think that inscrutables threaten to be experience specific? Russellian 
physicalists construe inscrutables as protophenomenal properties, which David J. Chalmers 
characterizes as follows: 
 
 
3 Morris 2016 and Brown 2017 are largely responses to Montero 2015. 
4 We follow Morris 2016 in using ‘grounding’ for both of these roles, despite the differences between property 
constitution and categorical grounding. 
…protophenomenal properties are special properties that are not phenomenal (there is 
nothing it is like to have a single protophenomenal property) but that can collectively 
constitute phenomenal properties, perhaps when arranged in the right structure. 
(Chalmers 2013: 259; italics in original). 
 
Because protophenomenal properties are non-phenomenal, they might not seem to be 
experience specific. But according to Morris and Brown, the experience specificity of 
protophenomenal properties is entailed by certain possibilities that Russellian monists 
standardly accept, namely: 
 
…the possibility of ‘bare structure’ (worlds with the same dispositional and relational 
character as the actual world, but with no inscrutables grounding that structure) as well 
as the possibility of what might be called ‘swapped inscrutables’ (worlds with the same 
dispositional and relational character as the actual world, but with a different distribution 
of experience — including worlds without any experience — in virtue of instantiating 
different inscrutables).5 (Morris 2016: 184) 
 
Morris argues for the entailment as follows. Consider first a world of bare structure. The 
possibility of such a world shows that protophenomenal inscrutables are not needed to ground 
 
5 The sort of possibility Morris (2016: 187, fn. 11) and Brown (2017: 35) have in mind is metaphysical possibility, that 
is, possibility tout court (Kripke 1972). 
the actual world’s ‘dispositional and relational character’, that is, its structure. Rather, such 
inscrutables are needed only to ground experience. Morris writes, 
 
…if the structure of the world could exist as it is ungrounded, the inscrutables are needed 
specifically to ground experience in the actual world, and…it is in this capacity that they 
differentiate our world from the world of bare structure. (Morris 2016: 186) 
 
Thus, although protophenomenal inscrutables would, in the actual world, ground both 
experience and structural properties, the possibility of a bare-structure scenario implies that 
their role in grounding structural properties is contingent and therefore not individuative (Morris 
2016: 186–87). By contrast, their role in grounding experience is indispensable, and hence 
individuative, as the same possibility indicates. 
Morris supports his reasoning with a Kripkean (1972) creation metaphor: 
 
…[W]hy should God have created the inscrutables that are instantiated in the actual 
world? If worlds of bare physical structure are possible, God did not need to create the 
inscrutables in order to create the entire dispositional and relational character of the 
world... Rather, the answer appears to be experience-relevance: God created a world with 
the inscrutables because without them the world would be devoid of experience. In this 
sense, if worlds of bare structure are possible, the inscrutables in the actual world are 
experience-specific, despite grounding the structure of the world… (Morris 2016: 186) 
 
Morris’s argument concerning swapped-inscrutable scenarios parallels his argument concerning 
bare-structure scenarios. Thus, according to Morris, if worlds of bare structure or swapped 
inscrutables are possible, then protophenomenal inscrutables are experience specific. And if 
protophenomenal inscrutables are experience specific, then Russellian physicalism is not a 
genuinely physicalist view. 
Brown endorses Morris’s reasoning and adds complimentary points. In particular, he 
argues that the Russellian physicalist faces a dilemma. The protophenomenal properties she 
posits are either experience specific or they are not. If they are experience specific, then any 
theory that posits them is not genuinely physicalist. But if they are not experience specific, then 
the Russellian physicalist is unable to give the familiar Russellian-physicalist response to the 
conceivability argument (Chalmers 2002) — a damning result, since enabling that familiar 
response is widely considered one of Russellian physicalist’s principal advantages over non-
Russellian versions of physicalism. Let us explain. 
The first horn of Brown’s dilemma is not a new move: all genuinely physicalist theories 
reject experience-specific fundamental properties. But the second horn needs elaboration. The 
conceivability argument employs something like the following premiss: 
 
(CZ) Zombie worlds — consciousness-free worlds that are physical duplicates of the actual 
world — are ideally conceivable. 
 
The familiar Russellian physicalist response to the conceivability argument is to reject (CZ), by 
arguing as follows: 
 
Consciousness-free words that are mere structural duplicates of the actual world might 
well be ideally conceivable. But consider what a complete physical duplicate of the actual 
world would entail. Such a world would duplicate not only the actual world’s structural 
features, but its protophenomenal features as well. And on Russellian physicalism, it 
follows that such a duplicate world would contain consciousness if the actual world does. 
So, (CZ) is false. 
 
According to Brown, the Russellian physicalist can give that response only if protophenomenal 
properties are individuated by their role in grounding consciousness, thus rendering them 
experience specific. His reasoning could be stated as follows. Suppose protophenomenal 
inscrutables are not individuated by their role in grounding consciousness: although 
protophenomenal inscrutables happen to ground consciousness, doing so does not make them 
the properties they are. In that case, there is no guarantee that a world duplicating all actual 
protophenomenal-and-structural properties would contain consciousness, even assuming 
Russellian physicalism is true. That is, if protophenomenal inscrutables are not individuated by 
their consciousness-grounding role, then a world that duplicated not only the actual world’s 
structural properties but its protophenomenal inscrutables as well might lack consciousness, 
unlike the actual world (as the Russellian physicalist envisages it). For if protophenomenal 
inscrutables are not individuated by their consciousness-grounding role, then they could be 
instantiated in worlds where they do not ground consciousness. But in that case the familiar 
Russellian physicalist response to the conceivability argument would be unavailable. Thus, Brown 
concludes, if the Russellian physicalist construes  inscrutables as protophenomenal properties, 
then either her theory is not genuinely physicalist or she cannot give the familiar Russellian 
physicalist answer to the conceivability argument, thus sacrificing one of the theory’s main 
purported advantages. 
 
3. Individuating Protophenomenal Inscrutables 
The move in the Morris–Brown argument we wish to question concerns the inference from the 
possibility of bare-structure or swapped-inscrutables worlds to the experience specificity of 
protophenomenal inscrutables (we will return to Brown’s reflections on the conceivability 
argument subsequently). That reasoning seems to involve the following steps. First, those 
possibilities entail that protophenomenal inscrutables ground the actual world’s structure only 
contingently (if at all) and thus such inscrutables are not individuated by that grounding role. 
Second, therefore protophenomenal inscrutables are individuated by their role in grounding 
experience. But what justifies that second step? 
Morris and Brown suggest that the possibility of bare-structure or swapped-inscrutables 
worlds shows that protophenomenal inscrutables play an indispensable role in grounding 
experience. But it is hard to see why that indispensability claim, by itself, would justify the second 
step in their reasoning. The claim that protophenomenal inscrutables are indispensable when it 
comes to grounding experience might justify a conclusion regarding how experiences are 
individuated, namely, that it is part of what experiences are to be protophenomenally grounded. 
But the second step in Morris and Brown’s reasoning concerns how protophenomenal 
inscrutables, not experiences, are individuated. And, generally, pointing out that property x is 
indispensable to the instantiation of property y does not show that it is part of what x is, part of 
what individuates x, that x grounds y.  So, there is a lacuna in Morris and Brown’s reasoning. To 
fill that gap, Morris and Brown would seem to be assuming something like the following claim: 
 
(G) Protophenomenal inscrutables are individuated by one or both of the grounding roles 
Russellian physicalists ascribe to them, that is, by their roles in grounding experience, 
structure, or both experience and structure. 
  
If true, (G) would justify the second step in Morris and Brown’s reasoning, of moving from 
‘protophenomenal inscrutables are not individuated by their role in grounding structure’ to 
‘protophenomenal inscrutables are individuated by their role in grounding experience.’ 
However, (G) is doubtful. This is so even if the reference of ‘protophenomenal’ is fixed by 
one (or both) of the grounding roles (G) mentions, as Chalmers seems to do in the passage quoted 
above. For comparison, consider that even if Leverrier fixed the reference of ‘Neptune’ by 
Neptune’s role in causing perturbations in Uranus’s orbit, it does not follow that having such 
effects is part of what individuates Neptune (Kripke 1972). This is the key point: 
protophenomenal inscrutables need not be individuated by any roles they play, let alone by the 
grounding roles mentioned in (G). Instead, they might be individuated just by what they are in 
themselves, that is, by their intrinsic natures — natures that might be physical and not experience 
specific. 
Rejecting (G) is not an ad hoc maneuver. On the contrary, the assumption that 
inscrutables must be individuated by their grounding roles is antithetical to Russellian monism. 
It is central to Russellian monism that inscrutables are not simply role players, at least not in the 
way that (G) suggests (Alter and Nagasawa 2012, Chalmers 2013, Coleman 2015, Alter and 
Pereboom 2019). This is true no less for Russellian physicalism than for non-physicalist varieties 
of Russellian monism. And importantly, the point applies equally to both of the grounding roles 
protophenomenal inscrutables are said to play. Russellian physicalists should reject the claim that 
protophenomenal inscrutables are individuated by their experience-constituting roles not just 
because they are physicalists but also because they are Russellian monists. On Russellian monism, 
inscrutables are not individuated by their grounding roles, period, including not only their role in 
grounding structure but also their role in grounding experience. 
There is no consensus among Russellian physicalists on what exactly the intrinsic natures 
of protophenomenal inscrutables are or how exactly those inscrutables ground experience or 
structure (that is, on how protophenomenal inscrutables collectively constitute phenomenal 
properties or on how they categorically ground physical dispositions). But two points should be 
noted. First, on Russellian physicalism, it is in virtue of those intrinsic natures, whatever they turn 
out to be, that inscrutables play their grounding roles.6 Second, on the proposals Russellian 
physicalists have actually made regarding those intrinsic natures, protophenomenal inscrutables 
are not individuated by their grounding roles. Consider two examples. Derk Pereboom (2011, pp. 
 
6 Morris (2016: 188-89) and Brown (2017: 39, 41) seem to lose sight of this point when they compare 
protophenomenal properties to Howell’s ‘schmairs’, which ‘are just like chairs, except that when zombies sit in them 
they are suddenly conscious. This is just a brute disposition of schmairs’ (Howell 2009: 93-4). Positing such a brute 
disposition is anathema to Russellian physicalists, who posit protophenomenal properties partly to explain how 
consciousness arises from physical phenomena. 
97–100), suggests that a protophenomenal inscrutable might be perfect solidity, the categorical 
basis for the dispositional property of impenetrability (a view he finds in Locke’s writings).7 Sam 
Coleman (2015, 2016) suggests that protophenomenal inscrutables might be identified with the 
qualities posited by panqualityism: such qualities are akin to those we perceive, such as redness, 
but are not themselves phenomenal properties (panqualityism’s qualities resemble what 
Chalmers (2006) calls Edenic properties). Although on both proposals protophenomenal 
inscrutables are ascribed roles in grounding structure and experience, on neither proposal are 
protophenomenal inscrutables individuated by those roles — they are individuated by what they 
are in themselves. Both proposals are compatible with protophenomenal inscrutables playing 
the grounding roles they do only contingently. For example, even if in the actual world perfect 
solidity—whatever that property turns out to be intrinsically — grounds impenetrability, perhaps 
there are possible worlds in which perfect solidity does not play that particular grounding role. 
Perhaps there are possible worlds in which perfect solidity does not play any grounding role at 
all. At least, such combinations of views do not seem inconsistent. 
We are not suggesting that the Russellian physicalist must maintain that 
protophenomenal inscrutables could be instantiated without grounding structure or experience, 
but only that she can do so. She can do so because, on her view, protophenomenal inscrutables 
are individuated by their intrinsic natures, not by their grounding roles. And if such inscrutables 
could be instantiated without grounding experience, then grounding experience clearly does not 
individuate them. Individuating physical inscrutables by their intrinsic natures, rather than their 
 
7 Morris (2016: 184, fn. 9) mentions Pereboom’s proposal. 
grounding roles, requires a somewhat expansive notion of the physical. But the Russellian 
physicalist would not regard that consequence as a drawback. On the contrary, from her 
perspective traditional physicalist theories err precisely in limiting the physical to properties that 
can be fully explicated by roles they play in causal spatiotemporal structure (Stoljar 2001). 
We could summarize our criticism by saying that the Morris–Brown argument rests on a 
false dilemma: assuming protophenomenal inscrutables must be individuated either by their role 
in grounding experience or by their role in grounding structure. A third alternative, of 
individuating protophenomenal inscrutables by their intrinsic, non-phenomenal natures, is a 
natural one for the Russellian physicalist to take. Indeed, it seems misleading to describe that 
alternative account as merely optional: it is arguably a core part of the view (Pereboom 2011: 
110, Alter and Pereboom: section 4.3). In any case, if the view is so understood, then it faces no 
threat from the claim that inscrutable-swapping scenarios or bare-structure scenarios are 
metaphysically possible, at least no threat of the sort Morris and Brown develop. Those 
possibilities might well entail that protophenomenal inscrutables are not individuated by the 
roles they play in grounding physical structure. But the possibilities do not entail, or even suggest, 
that protophenomenal inscrutables must be individuated by their role in grounding experience. 
Instead, they can be individuated by their intrinsic natures, which might be genuinely physical. 
The same point undercuts Brown’s contention that construing inscrutables as 
protophenomenal properties enables Russellian physicalists to answer the conceivability 
argument only if those protophenomenal inscrutables are experience specific. It is true that the 
Russellian physicalist’s response to the conceivability argument (her rejection of (CZ) above) 
depends on her claim that in the actual world protophenomenal inscrutables collectively 
constitute phenomenal properties, perhaps when appropriately structured. But she need not add 
to that claim that playing that role, of constituting phenomenality, individuates 
protophenomenal properties. She can reject that individuation claim in favor of the sort of 
approach that Russellian physicalists actually take: individuating protophenomenal inscrutables 
not by their grounding roles but instead by their intrinsic natures. 
Morris and Brown refer to the ‘purpose’ of the Russellian physicalist’s inscrutables, and 
Morris refers to why they are ‘needed’ as posits (Morris 2016, 186–87, Brown 2017, 38–40). One 
could formulate their main concern as the claim that protophenomenal inscrutables are 
experience specific because they have a consciousness-related purpose (though neither Morris 
nor Brown do so). But we can distinguish two claims that could be expressed by the sentence, 
‘Protophenomenal inscrutables have a consciousness-related purpose’: (i) it is built into the 
nature of protophenomenal inscrutables, i.e. it is part of their individuation conditions, that they 
play a consciousness-grounding role; and (ii) the Russellian physicalist posits protophenomenal 
inscrutables with the theoretical goal of accounting for consciousness. Although (i) entails that 
protophenomenal inscrutables are experience specific, (ii) does not. And the Russellian 
physicalist is committed only to (ii). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Thus, the Morris–Brown argument fails. The possibility of bare-structure or swapped-inscrutable 
worlds does not indicate that protophenomenal inscrutables are experience specific. For all 
Morris and Brown say, the Russellian physicalist can construe inscrutables as protophenomenal 
properties without undermining the physicalist credentials of her theory. Notably, neither Morris 
nor Brown regards the problem they allege for Russellian physicalism as insoluble. Indeed, both 
suggest possible solutions. Morris (2016: 195–96) suggests that Russellian physicalists might 
conceive of inscrutables and physical structure as being related by metaphysical necessity. Brown 
suggests that, 
 
…physical inscrutables must be apt for the generation of higher-level subjectivity, but not 
at all uniquely apt. They must be equally apt to generate all other higher-level properties, 
for instance solidity or opacity. (Brown 2017: 41–42) 
 
Though intriguing, both suggestions still reflect the assumption that physical inscrutables must 
be individuated by some or other grounding role they play, either in the actual world or across 









8 For helpful suggestions, we thank Christopher D. Brown, Robert J. Howell, Derk Pereboom, and both Analysis 
referees. 
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